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thinking of the self-contradictory and inconsistent interpretations of the Covenant which Mr. Wilson has given to us from time to time. We are willing for the present to close our eyes to his astonishing statement that this was a "people's treaty," and that we must "take it or leave it." What we are thinking of here is his inexcusable attitude toward the United States Senate.

The President, showing his repeated irritation at the United States Senate, was not in a dignified position. The United States Senate is a body of elected representatives of the people of this land, and its inquiry into the nature of this wrongfully named League of Nations was in direct fulfillment of its duty under the terms of the United States Constitution. In their representative capacity, the members of the Senate had a right and a duty to inquire into the nature and origin of the treaty; into the documents, published or secret; into the diplomatic methods, records, and negotiations; for without these facts the members of the Senate could not have placed the responsibility for the terms of the treaty, given their "advice" or "consent," nor have planned with wisdom the nation's international policy. That the United States Senate did inquire into the history and significance of the policy proposed by this treaty constituted a most fundamental thing in liberal foreign policy, for it was the only means by which the people of the United States could have spoken through their representatives and come to a meeting of minds. For the President to ignore and deride the Senate was as unnecessary as it was unwise, futile as it was inexcusable.

The United States Senate has rendered a service to the Society of Nations that is yet to be. The "reservations" revealed no opposition to the principle of a Society of Nations. Indeed, from our point of view, they showed a sentiment quite the contrary. They would have made a real League possible. True, they eliminated certain alleged terrifying "guarantees" and removed from our list of duties the doleful task of administering the treaty with Germany. And now, by rejecting the impossible thing, the Senate has left the way open for a legislative Conference of all the Nations to the up-building of international law and equity in conformity with tried and familiar methods.

We have pointed out from time to time that a league to enforce peace is a contradiction in terms. The proposed Covenant of the League of Nations as originally submitted to the Senate would have established a league to enforce peace and increased the possibilities of war. The changes proposed by the Senate would have removed from the League this unthinkable element of force, excused America from an irretrievable commitment to the extreme policy of the treaty, and paved the way for

a real society of nations based upon the consent of all. The great error of the President lay in his failure to see this. Having failed in this, his treaty, so far as the United States is concerned, is dead. It is better so.

FIRST BY LEGISLATION

IF WE are to follow the lamp of experience, any successful international organization for the maintenance of peace between the nations must begin with legislation. The details of procedure would be very simple. All the nations would send duly accredited delegates to a common conference, where they together, as a result of discussion, would draft in definite language rules of law relating to concrete needs and situations. After adoption by the conference, these proposed statutes would be laid before the respective powers for ratification. If ratified, the proposed statutes would then become law for all ratifying nations. By the means of such laws, passed and ratified in such ways, other international organs may be set up as time may prove to be necessary. This method of going about the business is not only simple, but it has been successfully tried by a thousand and one different international organizations, particularly by The Hague conferences.

By such a method no insuperable difficulties, such as confront us anent the proposed League of Nations, could possibly arise. We have no doubt that this is the reason why Senator James A. Reed, of Missouri, speaking in the United States Senate February 26, 1920, said: "I unhesitatingly declare that the instrument that was proposed by the *American Peace Society* could be passed in the Senate in one day's time." Senator Reed was referring to the declaration of principles adopted by this Society and run continuously on the inside of the front cover of this magazine since America entered the war. Indeed, the Senator incorporated our International Program of Peace Through Justice in his address. In his speech, which consumed nearly the entire session, the Senator also pertinently remarked:

"Mr. President, I have referred in the preceding remarks to the principle advocated by the *American Peace Society*, not because it was the only organization advocating the principles referred to, but on account of its activity and importance. It is proper to add that the principles by it advanced were those which have been upon the tongues and pens of distinguished men of this and other countries for many years. They were the principles sought to be wrought in agreement at The Hague Convention, where the foundations were laid for their ultimate acceptance. Scarcely a modern writer of note or recognized thinker ever went beyond those principles up to the very time the President departed for Europe. From all that was said prior to the closing of the doors of the peace conference, when the doc-

trine of 'open covenants, openly arrived at,' was supplanted by the policy of 'secret agreements, secretly arrived at,' the public had a right to believe, and did believe, that the fundamental principles of the league would be in accordance with these well-known and long-advocated policies."

By beginning in the natural way; namely, by the instrument of an international lawmaking body, all the difficulties now paralyzing reason would largely disappear. The details of organization, the selection of officers, the adjustment of finances, questions of exclusion and control; all elements involving personal equation; questions of representation, reduction of armaments, codes, guarantees, tariff control, waterways, neutrality, and the infinite number of others, would be settled in accordance with the principles of law and equity; and such laws, being the product of voluntary and co-operative beings, could through the years gradually reveal the ways to accomplish what now seems to be the impossible. Such a method of procedure could threaten in no sense the world as would any alliance for the enforcement of peace. It would be in conformity with the well-known principle that compulsory arbitration, compulsion and conciliation, are mutually exclusive terms and self-contradictory in nature. Presenting no fears, even of economic pressure, it would generate no dangerous hostilities, but would be a continuation of that very significant and familiar accomplishment most conspicuously set forth in that most illuminating "Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes" adopted at The Hague and ratified by the nations in 1899. As said by Mr. Charles E. Hughes, speaking with reference to the Adamson Law at Green Bay, Wisconsin, September 20, 1916: "All we have to do is to stand firmly for principle, and we can get justice done."

LET US MAKE SURE NOW

THE DAVY CROCKETT strain in us demands that before we go ahead we be sure we are right. To those who argue that we can safely accept the Covenant of the League of Nations, bad as it is agreed to be, because after we have signed it we can then proceed to patch it up, we would offer a word of warning. We would remind them of a single stubborn fact. That fact is this: When the United States signs the instrument she signs a treaty and assumes under it all treaty obligations. This means that she assumes every possible obligation, moral and legal, to abide by the terms of the treaty. When President Wilson or any one else advises us that when we have signed the treaty we have assumed no legal, but simply a moral, obligation, he renders a disservice to our thinking, an insult, indeed, to the moral intelligence of every right-minded American. The

second clause of article 6 of the United States Constitution provides that all treaties under the authority of the United States are the "supreme law of the land"; that, further, "the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." If, by signing the treaty, we become parties to this League of Nations, it becomes our moral and our legal obligation to do everything in our power to comply with the recommendations of the Council. In concrete terms that simply means that if the Council recommends that the United States shall send its armies to Abyssinia, we shall be legally and morally bound to do just that thing. A group of nine men dominated by five will have legislative, judicial, and executive power to decide whether or not the United States shall do that thing. It is conceivable that a situation might arise where the United States ought to send an army to Abyssinia; and if we, the American people, should feel that it was our duty to do that, we would do it; but that decision should be made, in our judgment, by the Congress of the United States, representing the people of the United States, and not by any group of five men sitting in Geneva or elsewhere. Davy Crockett's words were, "Be sure you're right, then go ahead." That has the American ring about it. Before we become a part of this alliance to enforce peace, let us first make sure of all that it means, for once the American people are convinced that a given course is right, they may be trusted to go ahead. They did it in the World War. They would do it again. But they knew where they were going then.

ENGLISH POETS AND THE WAR

DURING THE WAR there were poets who defended it, stimulated enlistment in it, and prophesied great things from it. Since it closed, the current of comment by the singers has been quite adverse. Their mood, especially those of them who actually fought in Europe, is one of "pacifism," of contempt for the bellicose arm-chair ranters for war who stayed at home, and a terrible realism in depicting their own and other soldiers' experiences.

"You hope that we shall tell you that they found their happiness in fighting,
Or that they died with a song on their lips,
Or that we shall use the old familiar phrases
With which your paid servants please you in the press;
But we are poets
And shall tell the truth."

Thus speaks Osbert Sitwell in "Argonaut and Jugger-naut."

Even more poignantly rebellious is Siegfried Sassoon,